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Radiation contamination found in LANL's plutonium hub; safety board said protocols not followed

  • By Alaina Mencinger amencinger@sfnewmexican.com
  • Aug 27, 2025

    Workers in Los Alamos National Laboratory’s plutonium facility tracked contamination throughout a waste staging area, according to a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board report this month, alarming radiation monitors in the basement.

    The area was labeled a “high contamination area” in response.

    But when a fact-finding meeting was held a few days after the incident, corrective measures couldn’t be developed, the report states, after the group of workers responsible for the waste didn’t show.

    A lab spokesperson attributed the absence to missing information.

    “At the time the meeting was scheduled it was not clear which group had generated the waste,” Steven Horak wrote in an email. “Because that information was not available, that group was not specifically invited to participate. There was an immediate follow up meeting with the group that generated the waste.”

    PF-4, LANL’s plutonium hub, is a more than 230,000-square-foot facility that started operating in 1978. The lab is in the midst of renovating the aging infrastructure and, at the same time, ramping up production capabilities for plutonium pits, the cores of nuclear weapons.

    A little more than a week before the Aug. 8 report was finalized, technicians found contamination on a half-dozen workers’ booties, leading back to an area with staged waste bags.

    After the monitors detected the contamination, technicians found a high concentration at a storage pallet where damaged waste bags were being stored.

    An unspecified type of oil was leaking underneath, according to the report.

    Horak wrote the personnel were wearing the correct protective clothing and no skin exposure occurred.

    The fact-finding meeting held after the incident found several procedures, including waste storage and packing procedures, hadn’t been followed and corrective measures were needed.

    “Corrective actions include increasing awareness of the procedure and creating a learning team to drive process improvements,” Horak wrote. “Lessons learned from the event will also be shared across the organization involved at the next scheduled safety standdown.”

    Attendees of the fact-finding meeting drew parallels to other contamination incidents in April, the report states, when evidence of the spread of heat-source plutonium contamination was reported twice in the facility’s basement. At the time, the origin of the contamination was unknown but was thought to be a collection of waste bags stored in the basement — although the bags contained waste from rooms with “minimal or no known quantities” of heat-source plutonium.

    “During a fact-finding meeting, Triad [LANL’s operating contractor] staff discussed a number of possible concerns, including the waste packaging, handling, and storage practices,” the May report stated. “Triad is continuing to look at corrective actions and steps they can take to improve waste handling and management practices for low-level waste in the Plutonium Facility."

    Earlier this year, LANL announced it was phasing in 24/7 shift operations in its plutonium facility. A fact sheet published on the New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions website said in fiscal year 2025, about 400 workers involved with PF-4 would move to shift work, joining a small percentage of workers who had been working the around-the-clock schedule since April 2024.

    At the time the fact sheet was published, there were four shifts: two day shifts and two night shifts. Shift workers would work days or nights four days a week, either Tuesday through Friday or Friday through Monday.

    “The Lab’s plutonium pit production mission brings unique challenges,” the fact sheet states. “Pit production involves starting and steadily increasing the production of war reserve pits while simultaneously updating PF-4 with equipment that will increase reliability for the mission. The main driver for the 24/7 shift is to ensure the equipment required for the pit mission is installed to support production needs."


    Published comments by Greg Mello:

    In 2018, Congress requested an independent study of NNSA's pit production plan. That study was done by the Institute for Defense Analyses. It concluded, in part, that "[t]trying to increase production at PF-4 by installing additional equipment and operating a second shift is very high risk." (p. vii at https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/IDA-NNSA-plutonium-strategy-ES_Mar2019.pdf). Congress has ignored the study it commissioned. So has NNSA. The LANL contractor, headed by its factotum Thom Mason, just salutes and says, "Will do. Just give us the money please. We are good boys and girls."

    At the time IDA did its study, NNSA was sure LANL could complete its preparations and start making 30 pits per year by 2026, at a total cost of $3 billion (see slide 9 at https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/PlutoniumPitProductionAoA_Nov2017_9pg.pdf.) Now, preparations won't be complete until at least the end of FY2032 (when the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project is complete; see p. 169 in NNSA's budget request at https://lasg.org/budget/FY2026/doe-fy-2026-vol-1.pdf) and the total cost will be several multiples higher than originally thought, so high that NNSA is reevaluating its options (Gigantic Department of Energy program to make plutonium warhead cores ("pits") has overshot its budget and is being re-evaluated; NNSA has no analysis of alternatives supportive of its present pit plans.)

    This month, the Department of Energy began freaking out about the the runaway budgets and schedules at both production sites (LANL and the Savannah River Site) and has ordered a review, somewhat as we have been requesting (Special Study of the NNSA's Leadership and Management of the Plutonium Pit Production Mission, and Energy Department asks its Office of Enterprise Assessments* for "special study" of pit production "leadership and management").

    At LANL, pit production has been roughly 7 years from fruition since 1996. The costs have been increasing steadily -- both the total costs and the forward costs from the date of each estimate. (Estimated costs of acquiring reliable 30 ppy at LANL, $ billions, Aug 27, 2025. The labels on the x axis are currently missing and we will fix that today.) In other words, the more money that has been invested in LANL pit production, the more money has still needed to be invested to get to the ever-receding promised land of 30 pits per year. It is a self-licking plutonium ice cream cone. So far, LANL has produced one (1) pit, for its $13 billion investment so far.

    And no, we don't need the pits. There is nothing wrong with the pits we have (except their very existence). The whole program is to enable a new warhead that will allow the vastly over-budget Sentinel missile, if it is ever built, to be deployed with multiple warheads, or more prosaically, to pump up the NNSA warhead complex, Livermore lab especially, with new work, to the delight of interest-conflicted congresspersons.

    The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its wisdom, reported a bill last month that would require 24/7 production at PF-4, and increase the production requirement at LANL to at least 80 pits each year, i.e. to an average of roughly 100 pits per year (Senate bill would relax near-term production deadlines for nuclear warhead cores at Los Alamos, double outyear production requirements). They did that because LANL, NNSA, and the Pentagon told them they could and should do that.

    Underneath the headline in this story, LANL's plutonium facility has a problem with competence, training, and experience. Pushing new workers or any workers into overnight plutonium shift-work is a bad idea. LANL will do superficial studies of what went wrong, but LANL will not examine the basic premise involved, which speaks to errors made for political reasons at the very top of the lab. Thom Mason should have told NNSA right from the start that the IDA had a good point -- that it would be unwise and unsafe to make 24/7 production a baseline condition for LANL.


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