


*(TWILIGHT, MOON RISING, COYOTES SINGING, STARS WHEELING, PATH, COMPANIONS)*

## The “new Manhattan Project” and our choices today

*The first step is to recognize we have choices.*

***“We have had the bomb on our minds since 1945. It was first our weaponry and then our diplomacy, and now it’s our economy. How can we suppose that something so monstrously powerful would not, after years, compose our identity?” E.L. Doctorow***

***“Only he who knows the empire of might and knows how not to respect it is capable of love and justice.” Simone Weil***



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To subscribe to the Study Group's main listserve send a blank email to [lasg-subscribe@lists.riseup.net](mailto:lasg-subscribe@lists.riseup.net)

To subscribe to the Study Group's New Mexico listserve, send a blank email to [lasg\\_activist\\_leaders-subscribe@lists.riseup.net](mailto:lasg_activist_leaders-subscribe@lists.riseup.net)

Blog: <https://lasg.org/wordpress/>

## **This talk:**

- **What is the Los Alamos Study Group?**
- **Background on nuclear weapons and NM lab budgets**
- **Update on pit production, LANL's new and largest program**
- **Current hot nuclear issues – as of last week, all interconnected**
  - **New START extension / MIRVing U.S. missiles / Relations with Russia / Ukraine war**  
<https://lasg.org/Ukraine/Ukraine.html> / Tomahawks / Typhon / Dark Eagle
  - **Modernization: Poseidon, Burevestnik, Sentinel, B-21, Columbia**  
<https://lasg.org/Modernization/Modernization.html>
  - **The now-perennial issue of LANL bursting at the seams, dramatically and negatively impacting the region, County, and itself** [https://lasg.org/MPF2/first\\_page.html](https://lasg.org/MPF2/first_page.html)
  - **“Nuclear testing” (is NOT going to happen; more \$ for the labs is); surrogate testing and warhead certification**
  - **Pit production at LANL delayed again / recycling pits / safety at LANL**

# What we want right now (for example):

- **New START: ACCEPT the offer of a year's extension, then negotiate**
- **END U.S. support for Ukraine proxy war against Russia**
- **END aspirations for industrial plutonium pit production at LANL (cancel the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project, LAP4)**
- **REQUIRE accountability from LANL for safety and program failures**
- **CANCEL the W87-1 and W93 warheads and the Sentinel and SLCM-N delivery systems**
- **CUT the two redundant physics labs (LANL and LLNL); LANL losing >800/yr**
- **END congressional support for Israeli genocide. Let's speak up more.**
- **STOP supporting corporate boondoggles like data centers. NM is at grave risk from "pollution shopping and corporate takeover.**

*Of course we are also always looking for talent, money, and volunteer help.*

## Big picture: unsustainable budget priorities [*slide from May 2025*]

- \$1+ trillion military budget proposed via flat discretionary spending plus a big plus-up in the current reconciliation bill. If off-budget defense functions and military-related interest costs are included, the total will approach \$2 trillion.
- At \$1 T, this costs \$7,600 per household. As will be seen sooner or later, this is going to be politically unbearable. It is a central narrative that could resonate with essentially all parts of the U.S. political spectrum among voters.
- NNSA and DoD are embarked on a gigantic nuclear modernization spree, the costs of which have grown 25% in just the last year ([“CBO predicts US nuclear weapons will cost nearly a trillion dollars over the coming decade, 25% more than two years ago; Most expenses are for modernization, not deployment and maintenance, LASG, Apr 28, 2025](#)).
- NNSA to get a \$6 B [turned out to be \$5 B] increase (25% YoY) via reconciliation ([“Trump administration seeks huge increase in nuclear warhead spending, the largest since 1962; Meanwhile NNSA sits on a large pile of unspent funds, LASG, May 2, 2025](#)). The details await the administration’s congressional budget request.

# Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, by Department and Function


Billions of dollars

## CBO: Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2025 to 2034, April 2025


	2025			Total, 2025–2034		
	DoD	DOE	Total	DoD	DOE	Total
CBO's projections of budgeted amounts for nuclear forces <sup>a</sup>						
Nuclear delivery systems and weapons						
Strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons						
Ballistic missile submarines	16.0	1.4	17.4	204	23	228
Intercontinental ballistic missiles	7.9	1.3	9.2	126	14	140
Bombers	4.3	1.4	5.7	56	9	65
Other nuclear activities <sup>b</sup>	1.9	n.a.	1.9	21	n.a.	21
Subtotal	30.2	4.1	34.3	408	46	454
Tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons						
Nuclear weapons laboratories and supporting activities						
Stockpile services	n.a.	1.4	1.4	n.a.	16	16
Facilities and infrastructure	n.a.	9.2	9.2	n.a.	110	110
Other stewardship and support activities <sup>c</sup>	n.a.	6.1	6.1	n.a.	67	67
Subtotal	n.a.	16.7	16.7	n.a.	193	193
Subtotal, nuclear delivery systems and weapons	30.7	21.0	51.8	418	245	663
Command, control, communications, and early-warning systems						
Command and control	3.4	n.a.	3.4	35	n.a.	35
Communications	4.0	n.a.	4.0	41	n.a.	41
Early warning	6.7	n.a.	6.7	78	n.a.	78
Subtotal, command, control, communications, and early-warning systems	14.1	n.a.	14.1	154	n.a.	154
<b>Total budgeted amounts for nuclear forces</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>65.9</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>817</b>
CBO's estimates of potential additional costs based on historical cost growth						
<b>Total estimated costs of nuclear forces</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>65.9</b>	<b>651</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>946</b>


# Budgeted Amounts for Nuclear Forces, by Activity, 2025 to 2034

Billions of dollars



**AEC/ERDA/DOE/NNSA Annual Spending for Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, Testing, and Production: NNSA Weapons Activities with administrative costs included; constant 2025\$; ≥FY26 requested, in then-year \$. Updated 6/3/25.**






**Figure 5–22. Projected out-year budget estimates for DOE/NNSA Weapons Activities in then-year dollars, including the escalated President’s Budget Request**


# Blueprint Roadmap

Mission-driven infrastructure investments – on time, at scale



**NUCLEAR STOCKPILE ●**  
**GLOBAL SECURITY ●**  
**NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION ●**

NNSA Weapons Activities, Sept. 2024  
 NNSA estimates (in FY2025 SSMP) vs. FY25 actual and FY26 requested in May 2025.  
 NNSA sought and received \$4.8 B in (mandatory) reconciliation resources in the so-called "OBBB."  
 NNSA had previously received an extra \$1.88 B in "emergency" WA funds during the Biden lame-duck period.




## National Nuclear Security Administration by Federal Account for FY 2025



View Outlays

What is this? ▾



The piggybank. Why LANL and SNL could work right through the shutdown.

# From USASpending.gov, 11/17/25

## TIME PERIOD

10/01/2025 to 09/30/2026

## PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

STATE | New Mexico

## AWARDING AGENCY

Department of Energy (DOE)

## Prime Award Results

Contracts **34**

Contract IDVs 0

Grants 18

Direct Payments 0

Loans 0

Other 0

Prime Award ID	Recipient Name	Obligations	Outlays
DENA0003525	NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS OF SANDIA, LLC	\$38,232,876,796.20	\$22,172,800,157.56
89233218CNA000001	TRIAD NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC	\$30,014,545,544.93	\$20,356,906,402.73


### F.2.3.2 Funding

**FY 2024 DOE request – site funding by source  
(total SNL FY 2024 request = \$3,188 million)**


**SNL split for the FY 2024 Weapons Activities  
President’s Budget Request (\$2,681 million)**

**FY 2024 Site Funding by Source**

Less than or equal to 1% (each)  
Environmental Management  
Other Defense Activities  
Nuclear Energy  
Fossil Energy and Carbon Management  
Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response  
Nuclear Waste Fund Oversight



**FY 2024 Site Funding for Weapons Activities**



In FY24, SNL also had \$1.65 B in spending from other federal agencies, mainly defense, or \$5.11 B in all.

In FY25, WA = 85% of DOE spending at SNL (\$3.462 B)  
In FY26 request, WA = 88% of DOE spending at SNL (\$3.502 B)

### F.2.2.2 Funding


**FY 2024 DOE request – site funding by source**  
*(total LANL FY 2024 request = \$4,922 million)*

Less than or equal to 1% (each)  
 Defense Environmental Cleanup  
 Other Defense Activities  
 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy  
 Nuclear Energy  
 Electricity  
 Cybersecurity, Energy Security and  
 Emergency Response  
 Fossil Energy and Carbon Management

Science 2%  
 Environmental Management 6%  
 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 9%

Weapons Activities 82%

**LANL split for the FY 2024 Weapons Activities**  
**President’s Budget Request (\$4,053 million)**




LANL typically also has \$250-\$400 M in spending from other federal agencies, mainly defense.

In FY25, WA = 83% of total DOE spending at LANL  
 In FY26 request, WA = 87% of total DOE spending at LANL

# Los Alamos National Laboratory Costs Incurred by Fiscal Year, billions of 2025 dollars

Los Alamos Study Group, June 27, 2025

For FY2026, the requested amount is shown. After 2002, "Strategic Partnerships" with other agencies, formerly called "Work for Others," are NOT included in LANL costs shown. Available WFO/SP data as of June 2025 are shown in the red bars in constant 2023 \$. NNSA site office costs not included after FY 2004.



*Greetings from*

**PLUTOPRIA**

*Richland USA  
Ozersk USSR*

# Stockpile Stewardship: How do we sustain the nuclear deterrent




501835  
B61 12  
SERIAL 020970

B61-12  
US Air Force  
Strategic Bomb

B61-7  
US Air Force  
Tactical Nuclear Bomb

**Plutonium  
bomb factory**



**for  
New Mexico**

**lasg.org**




LAMAR


COMO

# Modern U.S. ballistic missile warhead, late 1980s

## *W88 Warhead for Trident D-5 Ballistic Missile*



Sources for illustrations: Wikipedia





**Mark 21/W87 on single RV MM III bus, the present deployment configuration.**

**This RV is too wide and heavy for MIRVing MM III.**


**MM III in operation.**

**Result.**

**LANL TA-55 with its security fence, with PF-4 (large gray roofed building) in center; residences, public roads, and potentially exposed individuals in foreground. TA-55's location is not optimal for physical security.**





An aerial photograph of a large industrial or research facility. The site is densely packed with various buildings, including several large, long, low-profile structures with flat roofs. A prominent feature is a large, deep excavation or pit in the foreground, which appears to be a site for a canceled project. The facility is surrounded by a fence and is situated on a hillside. The surrounding landscape is a mix of dry, rocky terrain and dense evergreen forests. In the background, more industrial structures and a parking lot are visible. A road runs along the bottom edge of the site.

**TA-55 and PF-4. Note canyons on N and S, cliff at bottom of slide; excavation for canceled CMRR-NF in foreground; forests surrounding. The site is very crowded.**

**PF-4 was built circa 1975 (opening in 1978) for R&D, not production. It is crowded, inside and out, requiring 24/7 work reach even 20 ppy ([SA, 2020](#)).**



**Seismic “demand” has increased x3 horizontally and x6 vertically since it was built (Keilers, NNSA, 2014).**


**No one knows when or how PF-4 will fail. Hopefully not too many people will be hurt.**

**Los Alamos Study group photograph, April 2021, looking S (from 12,000 ft).**


**The  
Savannah  
River  
Plutonium  
Processing  
Facility  
(SRPPF),  
March 2025**




**Estimated costs of acquiring reliable 30 (30R) ppy at LANL, \$ billions. Sources: DOE, NNSA, GAO, LASG. June 2025 estimate may include cost increment to acquire two-shift "surge" capacity of up to 80 ppy by 2034 while producing at 30R during 2032-2033.**



**Estimated forward cost of acquiring reliable 30 (30R) ppy at LANL, \$ billions. Sources: DOE, NNSA, GAO, LASG. June 2025 estimate may include cost of acquiring two-shift "surge" capacity of up to 80 ppy while producing 30R during 2032-2033.**



**Estimated maximum cost of SRPPF plus estimated program costs through 2035, in billions of then-year dollars (NNSA, Parsons, LASG). NNSA's low-end costs are \$7.1 B less than those shown for the last two estimates.**



NNSA's pit production program, the largest program in the agency's history, is in trouble. None of its statutory production deadlines are going to be met. Estimated costs have increased by roughly a factor of five overall. Overall success is "far from certain," as the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) prophetically (and euphemistically) put it in 2019.

We believe NNSA has bitten off more than it can chew in this program. DOE is concerned, as it should be ("[Energy Department asks its Office of Enterprise Assessments\\* for "special study" of pit production 'leadership and management'](#)," Aug 19, 2025).

The Senate proposes to change the immediate pit production deadline (from  $\geq 30$  pits per year by 2026 to  $\geq 30$  ppy by 2027, the  $\geq 20$  ppy deadline for 2025 now being moot) while optimistically increasing short-term production goals at LANL ( $\geq 50$  ppy by 2029, and  $\geq 80$  ppy by 2032), in opposition to the recommendations of both NNSA itself and the IDA during the first Trump Administration ("[Senate bill would relax near-term production deadlines for nuclear warhead cores at Los Alamos, double outyear production requirements for Los Alamos, and cement Savannah River's production role](#)," Aug 15, 2025).

**We do not believe the Senate language regarding an increase of pit production at LANL is wise, to say the least. In effect, the Senate NDAA would permanently mandate 24/7 shift work at LANL's PF-4 facility, at least until SRPPF achieves full rate production 10-15 years from now. This policy will end in tears.**

Contrary to what some say, if the U.S. wants to have an enduring pit production facility, there is at this point only one choice, and it's not any current or future facility at LANL. Current facilities are not adequate to purpose, and neither is the site as a whole. ([Overview of Pit Production Challenges at Los Alamos National Laboratory](#), presentation to the Governor's Nuclear Advisory Council, Columbia, SC, Apr 29, 2024, [video](#)).

“Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.”

In memory of

**Joseph Rotblat**

(1908 - 2005)

He left Los Alamos in December 1944 for conscience's sake and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for decades of nuclear disarmament leadership.

May many others follow his example.

