A Resolution Objecting To the Expansion Of Nuclear Weapons Work and the Production Of Plutonium Warhead Cores ("Pits") at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Opposing Additional LANL Facilities In Santa Fe[1]

Los Alamos Study Group, September 1, 2026

1. **RECALLING** that the City of Santa Fe (City; full name, "The Royal City of the Holy Faith of Saint Francis") is named for the "holy faith" of Saint Francis of Assisi, whose faith led him to become a man of peace and nonviolence in thought, word, and deed; and

2. **RECOGNIZING** the signal importance of Santa Fe's historic identification with ideals of human dignity and peace, and conversely the moral and reputational damage that would accrue if the City were seen as supportive of, or complicit in, the further refinement and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) such as nuclear weapons; and

3. **RECALLING** that in February of 2005, the City became a member of Mayors for Peace,[2] endorsing a goal of peaceful transformation toward a more sustainable world, including the goals of eliminating nuclear weapons while in the meantime promoting a culture of peace, not war;[3] and

4. **FURTHER RECALLING** that the city of Santa Fe has previously declared its unconditional opposition to the production of plutonium warhead cores ("pits") at LANL in resolutions 2003-64, 2005-39, 2006-104, and 2008-17; Resolution 2005-39 in particular establishes the identity of the city of Santa Fe as supporting and leading in nuclear disarmament;[4] and

5. **OBSERVING** that eight decades of lavish federal spending at LANL have not fostered equitable social and economic development, including the most recent decade in which LANL spending and employment roughly doubled;[5]

6. **OBSERVING** that in February of this year, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Department of Energy's semi-autonomous nuclear weapons agency, distributed a management directive mandating among other things that LANL double its target rate of pit production from 30 to at least 60 pits per year;[6] and

7. **OBSERVING** that in March of this year, NNSA chose what it calls the "Expanded Operations Alternative" for the future of LANL, which involves constructing approximately 219 new facilities with a total floor area of 5.6 million sq. ft. plus more than 100 facility upgrades, plus utility and infrastructure projects covering 1,200 acres, nearly all of which are for nuclear weapons;[7] and

8. **OBSERVING** that in April of this year, NNSA proposed to increase LANL's pit production budget by 90% for next year, from $1.3 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2026 to $2.5 billion in FY2027[8]; overall funding for LANL's nuclear weapons programs is slated to increase by 39% year-on-year;[9] and

9. **OBSERVING** that DOE is currently executing a semi-secret effort called "Project Velocity" which involves revising approximately 80 safety and other regulations[10]; total allowable radiation doses to LANL workers are now five times greater than heretofore[11]; and the Secretary of DOE has approved the removal of the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) standard for radiation exposures[12]; and

10. **FURTHER OBSERVING** that the recent past and expected future growth of nuclear weapons programs at LANL has impelled Congress to require a study of possible future satellite LANL campuses, in order to alleviate the severe traffic and housing problems created by LANL's growth, which study is to be completed this summer[13];

11. **WHEREAS,** this unprecedented transformation of LANL includes a full-scale production plant to produce plutonium pits, the fissile cores or triggers for nuclear warheads and bombs, which are weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and

12. **WHEREAS,** plutonium pit manufacturing is manifestly dangerous to workers and, in the event of serious accidents or intentional malicious acts, to the public and the environment; and

13. **WHEREAS,** even in normal operations plutonium pit production involves extensive production, storage, and transportation of transuranic (TRU) waste and other toxic wastes; and

14. **WHEREAS,** LANL's main plutonium facility was designed and built more than 50 years ago for R&D purposes only, and is too old and too small for the required pit production mission[14], thus necessitating the concurrent construction of a second, larger, brand-new pit factory in South Carolina[15]; and

15. **WHEREAS,** newly generated TRU waste from plutonium pit production, according to NNSA, has been and is being prepared and shipped for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), often with priority over the legacy TRU waste long stored at LANL's Area G in tents; and

16. **WHEREAS,** in addition to the international law already in place at the time of Resolution 2005-39, 100 countries have signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons for state parties; 75 of which have concluded their respective ratification and accession processes; and

17. **WHEREAS,** nuclear weapons activities at LANL have caused permanent environmental contamination and desecration of ancestral tribal lands, including sacred sites.

18. **NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED BY THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE CITY OF SANTA FE** that the governing body, on behalf of its constituents, states its opposition to all plutonium warhead core ("pit") production at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL);[16]

19. **BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Governing Body opposes, within the limits of state and federal law, the expansion of LANL activities in the City of Santa Fe;

20. **BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Governing Body calls on the New Mexico Congressional Delegation to:

    1. Oppose further preparations for quantity plutonium pit production at LANL[17];
    2. Oppose all plutonium pit production at LANL, limiting any production activity to the lowest level consistent with technology demonstration and training only[18];
    3. Oppose the Trump Administration's new requirement for LANL to produce at least 60 pits per year[19];
    4. Remove the current statutory requirement to produce at least 80 pits in 2030 and prevent other new statutory pit production requirements[20];
    5. Prioritize the removal and disposal of legacy plutonium waste from LANL over the production of additional such waste from nuclear weapons activities, including pit manufacturing and preparations for pit manufacturing[21];
    6. Work to decrease the level of federal spending currently allocated for nuclear weapons activities[22];

21. **BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Governing Body directs the City Clerk to send copies of this resolution to the members of the New Mexico congressional delegation, the Governor, the Secretary of the Department of Energy, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

[1] LANL Director for Mission Operations Mark Davis, May 5, 2026, "I'm sure your big concern is traffic in the area, how we get adequate housing for the workforce that we need. So we're looking at options off the Lab – transferring some of the non-hands-on work that we do off the Lab in Santa Fe or somewhere else, down the hill in Pojoaque, We're looking at those options working with NNSA. There's certainly nothing at the level that I can talk about but there's discussions underway." ("LANL Now At 'Fourth Age Of Deterrence' – Stockpile Modernization, 'Heart And Soul Of Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Is Now Here In Los Alamos'," Davis Tells County Council, *Los Alamos Reporter*, May 6, 2026.

[2] https://www.mayorsforpeace.org/en/members/list-members/north-american/

[3] https://www.mayorsforpeace.org/en/visions/outline-visions/

[4] NM local govt resolutions & letters re: nuclear weapons & plutonium pit production at LANL

[5] Failing State: How New Mexico Ranks, table, updated Jun 8, 2026; "If Los Alamos is bringing economic development to New Mexico, why is the neighboring County of Rio Arriba performing so poorly?" Los Alamos Study Group research note, updated May 16, 2025; "Failing State: How New Mexico Ranks; "Despite massive spending over 8 decades and recent growth, New Mexico's nuclear labs have not brought economic development," Los Alamos Study Group, Jan. 8, 2025; LANL costs incurred by fiscal year in 2025 dollars, Los Alamos Study Group; "Does Los Alamos National Lab Help or Hurt the New Mexico Economy? Los Alamos Study Group working paper, Jul 2006; Angela Garcia, "Land of Disenchantment," *High Country News*, April 6, 2006.

[6] Transformative Objectives framework for enterprise modernization,, David E. Beck, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, NNSA, Feb 11, 2026.

[7] NNSA releases final LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) and Decision to pursue massive LANL expansion..., Mar 26, 2026.

[8] NNSA "Weapons Activities" budget request, p. 16. Our "90%" includes the proposed $89 million Plutonium Engineering Support Building, Project 27-D-512, p. 19.

[9] DOE Laboratory Tables p. 45.

[10] Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), March 17, 2026 letter to DOE Secretary Chris Wright. See also DNFSB, July 10 2026 Report to Congress on Access Denials and DNFSB, August 13, 2026 testimony to the Hazardous and Radioactive Materials Committee of the New Mexico Legislature.

[11] Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow for additional annual worker dose, NNSA official says, *Santa Fe New Mexican,* Feb 28, 2026.

[12] Memorandum for Secretary of Energy Wright, approved by him Jan. 9, 2026.

[13] There have been multiple initiatives in this direction, from LANL (Triad), NNSA, and Congress. I cannot immediately find the most recent legislative attempt, referenced by Martin Heinrich in an April 30 press release which also bears on public-private partnerships in Albuquerque (and now Santa Fe) to enhance NNSA's inertial confinement fusion efforts: "Heinrich Presses NNSA Administrators on Los Alamos Housing Supply, Clean Up Efforts Near LANL, & Creating Public-Private Partnerships in New Mexico to Accelerate America's High-Yield Fusion Capabilities." Inertial confinement fusion is the key physical principle behind thermonuclear weapons.

[14] NNSA, Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), Oct 2017; Pu Pit Prod Engineering Assessment (EA), Rev 2, Parsons for NNSA, Apr 20, 2018; Independent Assessment of the Plutonium Strategy of the NNSA, IDA, for DoD, Mar 2019; JASON letter report on plutonium pit aging, JSR-19-2A, Nov 23, 2019; Los Alamos Study Group comments on the draft Plutonium Pit Production Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, May 12, 2026; Prepared remarks for a panel discussion at the National Press Club by Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group, 11/13/24.

[15] Construction of a larger pit factory in South Carolina is now required by statute. FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Public Law 119–60, Dec 18, 2025, Section 3112.

[16] This is consistent with the four prior resolutions cited (in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008). We believe it is very important for decision-making parties in government to see the Governing Body make this conscious political and moral choice anew. While non-binding, it will influence other parties who *do* wield power in the federal government and will help shape discourse in civil society.

[17] This paragraph might include the clause: "including but not limited to the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4)." We have tentatively stricken it because it is rather "wonky."

In any case *preparations* for pit production, which are expected to continue through FY2034 in two major projects if not also others, currently comprise the greater part of the pit production effort at LANL. LAP4 is the centerpiece but not the only project capturing those preparatory efforts. These extensive preparations are running concurrently with ramping up production. Actual production levels are now classified, and there is some ambiguity as to what actual production of is "War Reserve" pits, and what is *practice* production of "demonstration" pits not certified to be deployed in weapons.

Formally, NNSA says LAP4 pertains to pit production over 10 pits per year (ppy).

If LANL were to temporarily halt production, while continuing *preparations* for pit production, production at a higher level would be sure to follow. For all we know, actual production may have already been halted to speed up installation of equipment for greater pit production in a year or two. In an unpublished speech, NNSA vaguely hinted this might be the case.

In its FY2027 budget request, the Trump Administration proposes to increase the funds available for pit production (preparations and actual production, both) at LANL from $1.3141 billion (B) to $2.5021 B, *a 90% increase year-on-year*. The Study Group has compiled what is known and what can be reasonably extrapolated about past, present and future pit production costs ("Plutonium (Pu) Modernization Spending, Actual, Proposed, and Estimated, by Site and Fiscal Year", Jun 7, 2026 update.

The Trump Department of Energy (DOE) proposes a LANL budget for FY2027 of $6.754 B (p. 46). There is always income to LANL from other government agencies (mostly the Pentagon), typically in the range of $250-$450 million. See graph on this page. We can safely say that if the Trump budget for NNSA passes Congress, LANL will be a $7 billion laboratory and production site.

How much of LANL is pit production? Looking just at the DOE funds requested for LANL for FY2027 (which are mostly in NNSA), 37% of LANL's total DOE funding would be for pit production, up from 26% this year. LANL is increasingly acquiring the character of a "production agency," as NNSA now calls LANL. *In a debate (video) we held with the Heritage Foundation and NNSA, the Heritage spokesperson said the only LANL mission that could not be done elsewhere is also its most important mission: pit production.* Heritage is not the only entity which thinks this. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California is equally competent to LANL in nuclear weapons design. They also have much faster computers (currently, 20x as fast). *The Trump Administration is driving LANL toward a greater production identity, centered on plutonium*. The LANL pit mission is unbounded and will likely continue to grow until something negative happens to stop it.

Our sources tell us that an increasing number of people in Los Alamos – how many, we do not know – quietly do not support the pit production mission at the level of commitment the Trump Administration and Congress are taking it. They supported, or thought they did, what one source called a "softer" pit production mission but not what is happening now, which is negatively affecting Los Alamos itself in a number of ways.

In "normal" government operations, the planned 90% year-on-year increase in LANL pit funding would be unmanageable. However – and this is unique in the federal government -- all NNSA appropriations are "available until expended," i.e. they never expire or need to be returned to the Treasury if unused. NNSA can pad budget lines (as in this case) and can smooth out year-to-year differences as needed. Congressional appropriations staff tell us that NNSA obligates some of its extra money to its various site contractors, beyond the reach of Congress' eye, to hide the fact that NNSA has large unobligated balances. Even the appropriations committees do not know how much money LANL is spending. This is just one aspect of NNSA's "unusual" management. See: "Structural Features Making NNSA an Unusual Federal Agency," memo for VP Biden, 2016.

[18] Here the City would elaborate that it is *quantity* production, sometimes called "*rate*" production or what we at the Study Group call "*industrial*" production, which is being opposed. The Study Group does not oppose a "demonstration and training" role for LANL. Someone at the Pentagon reportedly said, "a dollar spent on pit production at LANL, beyond demonstration and training, is a dollar wasted." We agree.

[19] Less than a week after the expiry of the New START treaty, the last limitation on U.S. nuclear stockpile size, the Trump administration announced its intention to ramp up nuclear weapons production as fast as possible in order to "dominate" all

other countries. Central to this objective was to double or even triple LANL pit production as fast as possible. See "Responsive Today, Dominant Tomorrow: Enhancing American Nuclear Dominance:" Nuclear agency outlines ambitious near-term goals for nuclear warheads, labs, factories, and operations; Pit production at Los Alamos to be at least doubled if not tripled; other NNSA sites to help Los Alamos do so, details TBD, Feb 23, 2026.

[20] The only statutory plutonium pit production deadlines so far are in 50 U.S. Code § 2538a. Greater requirements could pass Congress this year ("House passes requirement to build more than 200 plutonium nuclear warhead cores annually by 2050; Views of key senators, representatives not yet publicly known," Jul 23, 2026).

[21] Legacy plutonium (transuranic) waste (TRU) waste at LANL is mostly stacked in tents, with some still stacked under shallow earthen cover. LANL's allotted WIPP shipments have been mostly filled with newly-generated TRU, most of which comes from pit production and preparations for pit production. The New Mexico Environment Department has made removal of this waste a priority in its permitting at LANL; removal of this waste is a unanimous demand of all the "antinuclear" groups in New Mexico as well as all those individuals and organizations which have endorsed the Call for Sanity, Not Nuclear Production.

[22] This is also in the text of the Call for Sanity, Not Nuclear Production; i.e. is widely supported.