

Table 1: DOE/NNSA War Reserve (WR) pit production commitments and results at LANL				
Date of commitment	Production or capacity commitment, ppy	By this date	WR pits made that year	Notes
July 1996 ¹	Capacity and production at 50 or 100, whichever is desired, both single-shift. Operating cost of \$29 M same for both capacities. Capitol cost for 50 and 100 ppy: \$310 and \$354 M, respectively, in 1996 \$.	2003	0	80 ppy “sprint mode” said available using 50 ppy equipment with 2 shifts. These capabilities, commitments, costs, and schedule were the basis for choosing LANL as the interim pit production site. CPI inflator from July 1996 to April 2025 = 2.04.
Mar 1998 ²	20	2007	0	The 1996 production paradigm collapsed with discovery of much higher site seismicity ³ and shift in infrastructure plans; by this year a 4-year delay for even 20 ppy.
	50	ND		“eventual”, i.e. indefinite delay for 50 ppy; 100 ppy not mentioned
2000 ⁴	First production unit (FPU)	2001	0	
2001 ⁵	FPU	2009	0	8-year delay from 2000 commitment due to infrastructure delay. LANL director states that pit production is LANL’s “highest priority.” ⁶
Jan 2002 ⁷	FPU	2007	0	6 year delay from 2000 commitment.
2007 ⁸			11	These were W88 pits, of which a total of 30 were produced. PF-4 shut down for 1 month. ⁹
2008			6	
2009			4	
May 2010 ¹⁰	80	2022	6	19 year delay from 1996 commitment due to changing infrastructure plans.
Apr 2011 ¹¹	Up to 80	ND	2	Major criticality safety incident. Criticality staff start to quit. ¹²
2012			1	270,000 sq. ft. new plutonium facility indefinitely delayed after groundbreaking due to litigation, underlying problems. ¹³
Jun 2013 ¹⁴	10	2019	0	NNSA shuts down PF-4, which stays shuttered for high mass operations for nearly 4 years. ¹⁵
	20	2020		13 year delay from 1998 commitment
	30	2021		18 year delay from 1996 commitment
	Up to 80	2030		27 year delay from 1996; 8 year delay from 2010 commitment
Apr 2014 ¹⁶	10	2024	0	LANL sends explosive TRU drum to WIPP; explosion shuts down WIPP, cost ~\$2 billion. ¹⁷
	20	2025		Since previous year, 5 years additional delay for 10, 20, 30 ppy milestones
	30	2026		
	50-80	2030		Obviously “50-80” is not quite “80”
Mar 2016 ¹⁸	10, 20, 30, 50-80 as in 2014		0	
	“Demonstrate higher levels”	2027		
2017				PF-4 restarts high mass operations. ¹⁹ PF-4 not chosen for enduring pit production by NNSA. ²⁰
Oct 2018 ²¹	Same as previous commitments through 2026		0	This is now the two-site paradigm. LANL’s goal for 2030 has now dropped from “80” (2010) to “50-80” or “up to 80” (2011-2016) to “at least 30” ppy. Enduring PF-4 production returns.
	“at least 30”	2030		This is “30 reliable,” i.e. about 36-41 ppy on average. ²²
Dec 2020 ²³	“reliable,” “enduring” production of 30	2026	0	These qualities were not sought at LANL PF-4 in 2017 during the pit AoA. “Reliable” has a specific meaning; see below. Production is now said to require 24/7 operations. ²⁴ Up to June 2019, LANL production was described as single-shift.
	“Assess” greater than 30	ND		

¹ DOE, “Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives,” Jul 1996, https://lasg.org/documents/AnalysisOfStockpileManagementAlternatives_Jul1996.pdf, pp. 34-57.

² DOE, “Supplement Analysis: Enhancement of Pit Manufacturing at Los Alamos National Laboratory,” March 1998, pp. 5, 13, https://lasg.org/documents/SA_EnhancementPitManLANL,SSMP-EIS_Mar1998-withGMnotes.pdf.

³ Los Alamos Study Group, “Seismic Hazards at Los Alamos National Laboratory with Emphasis on the Plutonium Facilities at TA-55,” Jan 23, 1997, <https://lasg.org/archive/1997/seismic.htm>.

⁴ Cited in DOE Inspector General, “The Department of Energy’s Pit Production Project,” April 12, 2002, pp. 1-2, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/DOE-Pit-Production-Project-ig-0551_Apr2002.pdf.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ “The importance of Los Alamos’ role in the success of the program is illustrated by the statement of the Los Alamos Director, in April 2001, that the Laboratory’s highest priority was reestablishing the nation’s capability to manufacture pits.” Ibid., p. 5

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Pit production 2007-2012 is from LA-UR-12-25400, “Pit Manufacturing Fiscal Year 2012 Program Report to the University of California,” Bradford G. Story; reproduced in pertinent part at slide 24 in Los Alamos Study Group, “Pit Production Workshop: Why, how many, when, how, where, with what risks?” July 12, 2018, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/Mello_PitProductionWorkshop_12Jul2018.pdf.

⁹ Patrick Malone, “A near-disaster at a federal nuclear weapons laboratory takes a hidden toll on America’s arsenal,” Center for Public Integrity, June 18, 2017, <https://apps.publicintegrity.org/nuclear-negligence/near-disaster/>.

¹⁰ NNSA, Fiscal Year Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY2011 SSMP) Summary, May 2010, p. 36. https://lasg.org/budget/Sect1251_FY2011_SSM_summary_May2010.PDF.

¹¹ NNSA, FY2012 SSMP, p. 49. <https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2012.pdf>

¹² Patrick Malone, op. cit.

¹³ Los Alamos Study Group, “CMRR Project 2002 – 2014,” https://lasg.org/CMRR/open_page.htm.

¹⁴ NNSA, FY2014 SSMP, pp. 137, 238. <https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2014.pdf>.

¹⁵ Patrick Malone, op. cit.

¹⁶ NNSA, FY2015 SSMP, pp. 8, 24, 32. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2015_10Apr2014.pdf

¹⁷ Patrick Malone, “State: LANL, WIPP will face steeper fines,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, Jan. 28, 2015, https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/legislature/state-lanl-wipp-will-face-steeper-fines/article_d4d6ff20-f04b-54e9-b52a-fb319dcb2187.html.

¹⁸ NNSA, FY2016 SSMP, p. 47. https://lasg.org/budget/FY2016/FY2016_SSMP16Mar2015.pdf

¹⁹ Patrick Malone, op. cit.

²⁰ NNSA, Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), Oct. 2017 pp. 47-48, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf.

²¹ NNSA, FY2019 SSMP, p. 49. https://lasg.org/budget/FY2019/SSMP_FY2019_Oct2018.pdf.

²² For “41,” see NNSA AoA p. 13. For “36,” see NNSA, Assessment of Pit Production at LANL, Office of Cost Estimating & Program Evaluation (CEPE), May 2021, p. 7, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/NNSA-AssessmentPitProductionLANLPlan_May2021.pdf.

²³ NNSA, FY2021 SSMP, pp. 10, 44-46. https://lasg.org/documents/FY2021_SSMP_Dec2020.pdf, pp. 10, 44-46.

²⁴ NNSA, Draft Supplement Analysis of the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, June 2019, p. 14. https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/CTSPEIS-SA_draft_DOE-EIS-0236-S4-SA-02_Jun2019.pdf. NNSA, Draft Supplement Analysis of the 2008 Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory for Plutonium Operations March 2020, p. 12. https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/LANL-SWEIS-SA-draft-0380-SA-06_Mar2020.pdf.

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Mar 2022 ²⁵	FPU	2023	0	
	10	2024		But at p. 188, production “capability”
	Produce 30	2026		But at p. 188, production “capability”
Mar 2023 ²⁶	30 “Base”	4Q 2030	0	50% probability of at least 30 ppy in a given production year ²⁷
	30 “Reliable”	4Q 2031		90% probability of at least 30 ppy in a given production year, using a single production shift. ²⁸ The change to single shift operation for 30 ppy “reliable” was published April 2022. ²⁹
Apr 2023 ³⁰	FPU	2023	0	
	30 “capability”	2026		This is not necessarily production at 30 ppy and may not be production at all. This is related to the “30 Diamond” (30D) strategy. ³¹ It appears to be “30B KPP1.” ³²
Nov 2023 ³³	FPU	2025	0	Note 2-year delay from April 2023 commitment. A 24-year delay from 1996.
	10	ND		The 10 ppy milestone was “removed,” probably due to 30D.
	30 “capability”	2028		Note 2-year delay from April 2023 commitment.
Mar 2024 ³⁴	30 “Base”	4Q 2030	0	Same as Apr 2023 commitment.
	30 “Reliable”	4Q 2032		This is for equipment install. Actual reliable production would follow in FY2033. This is a one-year delay from the Apr 2023 commitment. This is a 30-year delay from the 1996 commitment of 2003 and a 70% downscaling of LANL’s then-claimed single-shift capacity, now to be achieved with two production shifts instead of one. ³⁵
Sep 2024 ³⁶	No commitments were made, reaffirmed, or changed			The “approach” to LANL pit production was described without specific date commitments.
Oct 2024 ³⁷			1 so far this FY	FPU W87-1 pit
May 2025 ³⁸	30 “capability” by 2028 but no production commitments mentioned in testimony for FY2025 or FY2026	2028		Pit production was not discussed further in the May 7 open hearing.
	“Increased manufacturing rate confidence” at LANL	“early 2030s”		Presumably, completion of 30B KPP2 and 30R and subsequent operations.
June 2025	Same as March 2024, 30 Base and 30 Reliable, with dates as shown.	4Q 2030 and 4Q 2032, respectively		LAP4 envisions multi-shift operations and 800 additional workers per day, despite 30R ppy <i>single-shift</i> goal. ³⁹ LAP4 cost overrun triggers project reexamination. ⁴⁰ CMRR project, required for reliable 24/7 operations with expanded staff, is now not to be complete until 3Q 2034. ⁴¹ Although not a firm commitment, these provisions and likely others ⁴² attempt to create a two-shift capacity at LANL of up to 80 ppy, per policy and statute. ⁴³

²⁵ NNSA, FY2022 SSMP, pp. 11, 188. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2022_Mar2022.pdf

²⁶ NNSA, FY2024 Congressional Budget Request (CBR), p. 212. <https://lasg.org/budget/FY2024/doe-fy-2024-budget-vol-1-nnsa.pdf>

²⁷ This is 30 Base Key Performance Parameter 2 (30B KPP2): “Complete turnover to operations and equipment hot testing (as applicable) of the remaining equipment to support 30 war reserve PPY with moderate confidence.” <https://lasg.org/budget/FY2025/doe-fy-2025-budget-vol-1-v2.pdf>, p. 237.

²⁸ NNSA, FY2024 CBR. Process prove-in activities can be initiated only after the “30 Reliable” equipment set is installed (p. 216).

²⁹ NNSA, FY2023 CBR, p. 227.

³⁰ NNSA, FY2023 SSMP, p. 29, 138. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2023_Apr2023.pdf

³¹ <https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/NNSA-FOIA-24-00291-LB-30DiamondStrategyWHY.pdf>.

³² “Complete turnover to operations and equipment hot testing (as applicable) of the *minimum* equipment necessary for 30 war reserve PPY.” (emphasis added). See <https://lasg.org/budget/FY2025/doe-fy-2025-budget-vol-1-v2.pdf>, p. 237.

³³ NNSA, FY2024 SSMP, p. 183. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2024_Nov2023.pdf.

³⁴ NNSA, FY2025 CBR, p. 239. <https://lasg.org/budget/FY2025/doe-fy-2025-budget-vol-1-v2.pdf>.

³⁵ LANL began 24/7 plutonium operations in PF-4 in support of the pit production mission in April 2025 (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, April 20, 2025 Weekly Site Report, <https://www.dnfsb.gov/sites/default/files/2025-05/Los%20Alamos%20Week%20Ending%20April%202018%202025.pdf>).

³⁶ NNSA, FY2025 SSMP. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2025_Sep2024.pdf.

³⁷ NNSA press release of Oct. 2, 2024, <https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-completes-and-diamond-stamps-first-plutonium-pit-w87-1-warhead>.

³⁸ NNSA, May 7, 2025 written testimony of Teresa Robbins, Acting NNSA Administrator, p. 6. https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/nnsa_hasc-sf_2026_budget_testimony.pdf.

³⁹ NNSA, FY2026 CBR, pp. 173, 174. <https://lasg.org/budget/FY2026/doe-fy-2026-vol-1.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 172.

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 280, 286.

⁴² E.g. Sigma. NNSA, FY2026 SSMP, p. 4-20.

⁴³ See discussion in the Sept. 2, 2020 Amended Record of Decision (AROD) for the 2008 LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS).

https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/LANL-SWEIS-0380-AROD_2Sep2020.pdf. See also the statutory language of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, https://lasg.org/budget/FY2019/NDAA-PLAW-115publ232-Sec3120_13Aug2018.pdf. Surge production up to 80 ppy is part of the “No Action Alternative” in both the draft LANL SWEIS (p. S-8, <https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/EIS-0552-LANL-SWEIS-summary-Jan2025.pdf>) and the Notice of Intent (NOI) for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Plutonium Pit Production (p. 19707, <https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/EIS-0573-NOI-plutonium-pit-production-9May2025.pdf>).