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Sep 15, 2025
Bulletin 366: Letter to Congress and the Administration re plutonium pit production in the pending defense authorization bill; pit reuse study; the scary journey to work at LANL
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Dear friends and colleagues --
It occurred to me that some of you may be interested in the following short letter sent to some congressional and administration colleagues regarding pit production sent on 9/8/25, which summarizes some of the recent work we have done here on pit production.
But first, two new developments:
1.
Since we sent the letter below, the House passed its version of the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), without the objectionable Senate commands that would heap even more pit production on Los Alamos. The Senate has yet to pass its final draft bill and could fail to do so, in which case the differences between the House bill and Senate bill as reported from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) would be reconciled informally prior to final passage in both houses. The House bill, which contains no new production deadlines, is far preferable to the bill that was reported out from the SASC, discussed in the letter below.
The House report also contains a requirement to provide Congress with important, common-sense information regarding pit reuse (p. 361):
The committee is aware that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) maintains a significant inventory of legacy plutonium pits, which may have potential for reuse or refurbishment in support of national defense needs. The committee believes that a thorough assessment of these pits would help inform committee decision-making.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 1, 2026, on the quantity, condition, and suitability for reuse of all reserve plutonium pits. The report should include:
(1) an inventory and assessment of all reserve plutonium pits, disaggregated by type, age, physical condition, and any known degradation or safety concerns;
(2) an analysis of the technical feasibility, risks, and timelines for recycling or refurbishing legacy pits for use in modern warhead designs;
(3) a discussion of costs for and potential challenges associated with the reuse, recycling, or refurbishment of existing pits; and
(4) an assessment of the potential impacts on nuclear stockpile reliability, safety, and certification associated with pit reuse.
The report shall be unclassified and may include a classified annex if necessary.
With or without this report, we already know that plutonium pit production could be delayed for a decade at least without negatively affecting the U.S. nuclear deterrent, so-called, in the least.
2.
Yesterday, the Santa Fe New Mexican published a useful article on the often unpleasant and downright hazardous journey to work for those who commute to Los Alamos ("'People live here': Despite efforts by lab, county, many drivers in Los Alamos still feel roads are unsafe," Alaina Mencinger, 9/13/25, with Greg's published comments).
There are no easy solutions to the commuter quandary, which is closely related to the lack of affordable housing in LANL's laborshed and the shortage of skilled labor in the region, both of which are exacerbated by the high salaries and wages LANL offers across the board. The Los Alamos site was selected in 1942 in part because it was isolated, and it remains isolated today (LANL Director Thom Mason: "at the end of the world's longest cul-de-sac").
Here's the letter to Congress and the Administration.
Re:
- Multiple federal studies of plutonium "pit" production for new warheads underway as DOE, NNSA, and Congress grapple with extended schedules and exploding costs, Sep 3, 2025
- Current & historical cost estimates for reconstituting plutonium pit production, details, Aug 29, 2025
- Estimated costs of acquiring reliable 30 ppy at LANL, $ billions, Aug 27, 2025
- Estimated forward costs of acquiring reliable 30 ppy at LANL, $ billions, Aug 27, 2025
- Estimated maximum cost of SRPPF through 2035, Aug 27, 2025
- DOE/NNSA War Reserve (WR) pit production commitments and results at LANL, Aug 15, 2025
- Gigantic Department of Energy program to make plutonium warhead cores ("pits") has overshot its budget and is being re-evaluated; NNSA has no analysis of alternatives supportive of its present pit plans, Jul 12, 2025
Dear [congressional and administration] colleagues:
NNSA's pit production program, the largest program in the agency's history, is in trouble. None of its statutory production deadlines are going to be met. Estimated costs have increased by roughly a factor of five overall. Overall success is "far from certain," as the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) prophetically (and euphemistically) put it in 2019.
We believe NNSA has bitten off more than it can chew in this program. DOE is concerned, as it should be ("Energy Department asks its Office of Enterprise Assessments* for "special study" of pit production 'leadership and management'," Aug 19, 2025).
The Senate proposes to change the immediate pit production deadline (from ≥30 pits per year by 2026 to ≥30 ppy by 2027, the ≥20 ppy deadline for 2025 now being moot) while optimistically increasing short-term production goals at LANL (≥50 ppy by 2029, and ≥80 ppy by 2032), in opposition to the recommendations of both NNSA itself and the IDA during the first Trump Administration ("Senate bill would relax near-term production deadlines for nuclear warhead cores at Los Alamos, double outyear production requirements for Los Alamos, and cement Savannah River's production role," Aug 15, 2025).
We do not believe the Senate language regarding an increase of pit production at LANL is wise, to say the least. In effect, the Senate NDAA would permanently mandate 24/7 shift work at LANL's PF-4 facility, at least until SRPPF achieves full rate production 10-15 years from now. This policy will end in tears.
Contrary to what some say, if the U.S. wants to have an enduring pit production facility, there is at this point only one choice, and it's not any current or future facility at LANL. Current facilities are not adequate to purpose, and neither is the site as a whole. (Overview of Pit Production Challenges at Los Alamos National Laboratory, presentation to the Governor's Nuclear Advisory Council, Columbia, SC, Apr 29, 2024, video).
We also disagree with the unsupported SASC claim that the present overall ≥80 ppy production requirement is inadequate (Report, p. 348).
The story of broken pit production commitments at LANL is three decades long (DOE/NNSA War Reserve (WR) pit production commitments and results at LANL). At present, "reliable" production of ≥30 ppy is, according to NNSA, at least 7 years away (4Q 2032 or after). In 1996, reliable LANL pit production was also said to be 7 years away -- and so it has been, more or less, in all the years between, despite what is now a total investment since 2005 of $13 B (details; graph). If constant dollars are used, the total investment in pit production at LANL over the 2005-2025 period swells to $15 B, or $17 B over the 2000-2025 period. As each successive LANL strategy for pit production failed, a new one was proposed (Sketch of DOE/NNSA pit production strategies at LANL, 1987-present).
As you know, NNSA has no reliable cost estimates for pit production. To understand the scale and risks of this program we had to produce our own, based on NNSA's partial estimates and GAO's work (which was almost instantly made obsolete by NNSA's announcement, through DOE, of a 4-year delay in basic pit production at LANL). Our estimates and the assumptions we used are detailed at the links above.
Unless Congress steps in, NNSA is likely to simply reaffirm its present course of action with minor tweaks despite the signs of failure now apparent. NNSA needs a new analysis of alternatives for pit production prior to reaffirming its CD-1 decisions for LAP4 and SRPPF.
Pit production is not the only NNSA program which has badly blown any semblance of a reasonable budget. This constant-dollar graph of Weapons Activities provides historical context. I am sure you will hear from GAO later this year on just how well NNSA's overly-ambitious construction line-items are doing (not). NNSA is simply trying to do too much, and a large part of the problem is Congress piling on new requirements, as we see in the current Senate NDAA.
At LANL, total constant-dollar DOE costs have nearly doubled since 2018. I am sure you have heard plenty of hard-luck sales pitches from NNSA about its stuffed goose on "The Hill," where you don't have to be a $400,000 PF-4 employee (slide 20) or a new parent (slide 22) to enjoy paid vacations in faraway places for months at a time.
We believe the two-site pit "solution" is infeasible. Unless it is reconsidered, we are all going to find this out together, the hard way.
At LANL, estimated forward costs for its pit program are increasing each year, rather than decreasing as value is (supposedly) earned as costs are incurred.
NNSA has meanwhile introduced confusing intermediate milestones into its congressional testimony and budget requests regarding LANL pit production, such as acquiring "capacity" instead of actually producing pits, while postponing reliable production -- the original congressional and executive intent since 2018 -- farther into the future.
Will NNSA and LANL offer certified, war reserve recycled pits as surrogates for meeting statutory and contractual pit production milestones? We have heard a rumor to that effect.
We believe outright cancellation of the W87-1 program would be the best policy for short term new-pit requirements. There are plenty of W87-0s to use on those ill-considered Sentinel missiles -- but using recycled pits is certainly better than making new ones at LANL. Congress should be fully aware of the difference, however.
NNSA has been failing to meet its promised pit deadlines at LANL for 25 years. At this point, more failure is not a signal Congress should ignore. On or shortly after September 30, NNSA should tell us all the actual status of its pit program, including how many new pits it produced and how many recycled pits it certified in FY2025. This is a giant program and it needs accountability, so Congress and the Executive can make wiser choices.
Thank you for your attention...
Best wishes to all,
Greg, for the Los Alamos Study Group
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